

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK  
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
  
Plaintiff,

14 Cr. 68 (KBF)

DECLARATION OF  
ANDREW J SAYLER

-v-

ROSS WILLIAM ULBRICHT,  
  
Defendant.

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I, Andrew Sayler, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby affirm under penalty of perjury:

1. I am a computer scientist specializing in information security, computer systems, and technology policy. I have worked or studied in the field of computer security for over eight years. I hold both a PhD and MS in Computer Science and a Bachelors of Science in Electrical Engineering with a minor in Computer Science. My resume is attached. Exhibit 1.
2. I am familiar with network security analysis, including the analysis of network traffic captures such as pcap files. I am also familiar with Internet architecture and the operation of computer networks.
3. I examined pen register and trap and trace data provided to me as pcap files by Paul Grant, attorney, who advised me that he represents Ross Ulbricht in this case.
4. The pcap files appears to contain wide-area network (WAN) traffic involving communications between a cable modem and other servers on the Internet. These files show bidirectional traffic, but always involve a Comcast IP address (67.169.90.28) as one end of each exchange. Since the

traffic all appears to be between a modem and other systems on the Internet, it could have been collected by Comcast outside the home without needing to break any WiFi encryption or otherwise monitor the home's local-area network.

5. None of the pcap files provided to me appear to contain local-area network (LAN) or WiFi traffic internal to the house where the modem was located.

6. None of the pcap files provided appear to identify any of the MAC addresses internal to the home network or WiFi. They only show the external MAC address of the modem itself, plus the MAC addresses of other Internet systems, most likely routers on Comcast's network. All of the internal MAC addresses (for devices on the home network) would have been stripped from this traffic by the home's router or modem before the traffic entered Comcast's network where it appears these data were collected.

7. There is no way to know who within the house originated the network traffic I examined from the traffic alone. It appears to be an amalgamation of all the Internet traffic sent or received by every active device connected to the home's network at the time of collection. There is no way to know if this traffic is limited to a single individual or is from multiple individuals absent additional information about who and what devices were present on the network at the time of its collection.

8. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

9. I have also examined additional pen register and trap and trace data that Paul Grant provided to me in a csv (comma-separated value) format. Those csv files appear to contain a processed version of the same pcap data previously examined. As such, they do not present any significant new information beyond that provided by the pcap files and lead to the same conclusions.

10. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

13. None of the data I examined show any of the described LAN-side data collection, nor did it show the identification of any MAC addresses of any devices on the LAN network. I have seen no data which shows that any MAC addresses were collected by the government's efforts

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is not clear from the data I have been provided how the FBI obtained the MAC address of Ulbricht's laptop.

14. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15. Based on my education and experience, I disagree with the [REDACTED] statement regarding the uniqueness of a MAC address and, therefore, with the value of a MAC addresses for the purpose of identifying a device on a network. I know from my own study and work that changing a MAC address is a trivial operation on most systems. I have published an article on that subject. See Andy Sayler, *Network Anonymity Through "MAC Swapping"*. (An article appearing in 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, Volume 28, Issue 3, Autumn 2011. Middle Island, NY.)

16. I understand that when Ulbricht's laptop was seized, it was running Ubuntu Linux. Tr 856 - 858. On Ubuntu Linux it would have been a trivial step to change the MAC address of the laptop. Ulbricht could have collected other MAC addresses on any network he used, and then substituted other MAC addresses for his own. Similarly, other users on networks used by Ulbricht could have collected the MAC address from Ulbricht's computer, and used his MAC address as their own. [REDACTED] a MAC address is not a robust, unique identifier of a device on a network. The fact that MAC addresses can be easily changed is widely known.

17. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

18. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

19. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

21. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

22. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I have seen no basis for the [REDACTED] claim that the FBI had collected data that showed anything communicated to or from the SUBJECT COMPUTER.

23. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I have seen no data resulting from pen register or trap and trace data collection that supports the [REDACTED] claim to have uniquely identified Ulbricht's computer or any other computer present on the home's network.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed this 16th day of May, 2019.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Andrew J. Sayler".

Andrew Sayler, PhD

**Andy Sayler**

www.andysayler.com  
andy.sayler@gmail.com

**EXHIBIT 1 TO SAYLER  
DECLARATION****Education**

**University of Colorado, Boulder, CO** **GPA: 3.99**  
 PhD in Computer Science - Computer Systems Research Group **Spring 2016**  
**Areas of Research:** Security and Privacy, Operating Systems, Networking

**Tufts University, Medford, MA** **GPA: 3.59**  
 BS in Electrical Engineering, Minor in Computer Science **May 2011**  
**Honors:** Magna Cum Laude - Engineering Dean's List

**Employment**

**Twitter, Inc - Boulder, CO** **September 2016 - Present**  
*Senior Security Engineer - Enterprise Security Team*  
 • Tech lead for the Infrastructure Security Automation and Tooling Group  
 • Provided security consulting guidance and developed range of security measurement tools

**University of Colorado - Boulder, CO** **August 2011 - August 2016**  
*Teaching and Graduate Assistant - Dept. of Computer Science*  
 • Designed and administered a variety of educational technology systems for 1000+ CS students  
 • Taught Computer Systems, Operating Systems, and Development Methods and Tools courses

**Center for Democracy and Technology - Washington, DC** **May 2015 - July 2015**  
*Policy Technologist - Hatfield Summer Scholar*  
 • Represented security researchers in triannual 17 U.S.C. §1201 (DMCA) proceeding  
 • Led CDT efforts to reform Wassenaar export control rules related to encryption and security tools

**SolidFire, Inc - Boulder CO** **May 2013 - May 2014**  
*Development Team Intern*  
 • Created virtualization-based test and prototyping environment for SSD-backed SAN product

**Symplified, Inc - Boulder CO** **June 2012 - August 2012**  
*Development Team Intern*  
 • Implemented reverse-proxy-based Kerberos and NTLM authentication systems

**WMFO 91.5 FM - Tufts Freeform Radio - Medford, MA** **December 2008 - May 2011**  
*General Manager*  
 • Oversaw 15 member Executive Board managing a 200 staff-member community radio station

**Charles Stark Draper Laboratory - Cambridge, MA** **June 2010 - August 2010**  
*Navigation Engineering Intern - Draper Lab Scholar Program Member*  
 • Designed and implemented multi-node distributed ranging navigation simulation

**MIT Lincoln Laboratory - Lexington, MA** **June 2009 - August 2009**  
*Radar Engineering Intern*  
 • Designed, implemented, and tested network-centric radar (ROSA) software test suite

**Special Application Robotics - Loveland, CO** **May 2008 - August 2008**  
*Controls Engineering Intern*  
 • Designed, built, and programmed PIC embedded system brushless DC motor control boards



## Skills

**Computer:** Linux, Networking, Security, Firewalls, Virtualization, Systems Administration

**Programming:** Python, C, C++, Assembly, BASH, LLVM, MATLAB

**Other:** DevOps, Leadership, Public Policy, Agile Development, Free Software

## Awards

TPRC 44 Student Paper Award - First Place	2016
Hatfield Summer Scholarship for Public Policy and Service	2015
CU "Best Should Teach" Silver Award for Service as CU CS Lead TA	2014
CU CS Outstanding Teaching Assistant for TAing Operating Systems Course	2013
Tufts Alumni Association Senior Award for Academics and Leadership	2011
IEEE TePRA Student Robotics Competition - Second Place	2009
Tufts IEEE EE14 Microcontroller Design Project - First Place	2008
College Board National AP Scholar	2007

## Involvement

ACM Member	2013 - Present
USENIX Member	2013 - Present
EFF Supporter	2012 - Present
IEEE Member	2008 - Present
CU IT Student Advisory Board Co-chair	2014 - 2016
CU Hacking Club Coordinator and Hacking Team Coach	2012 - 2016
Tufts Formula Hybrid Racing Team - Lead Electrical Engineer	2009 - 2010

## Selected Publications

Andy Sayler, et. al. *Tutamen: A Next-Generation Secret Storage Platform*. Symposium on Cloud Computing, 2016. Santa Clara, CA.

Andy Sayler. *Categorizing, Analyzing, and Managing Third Party Trust*. TPRC 44, 2016. Arlington, VA.

Andy Sayler. *Securing Secrets and Managing Trust in Modern Computing Applications*. PhD Dissertation. University of Colorado, Dept. of Computer Science. 2016. Boulder, CO.

Andy Sayler, Dirk Grunwald. *Custos: Increasing Security with Secret Storage as a Service*. Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Timely Results in Operating Systems, 2014. Broomfield, CO.

Andy Sayler, Dirk Grunwald, et. al. *Supporting CS Education via Virtualization and Packages: Tools for Successfully Accommodating "Bring Your Own Device" at Scale*. SIGCSE, 2014. Atlanta, GA.

Andy Sayler, Eric Keller, and Dirk Grunwald. *Jobber: Automating Inter-Tenant Trust in The Cloud*. Presented at the 5th USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Cloud Computing, 2013. San Jose, CA.

Andy Sayler. *Network Anonymity Through "MAC Swapping"*. An article in 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, Volume 28, Issue 3, Autumn 2011. Middle Island, NY.

## Additional Information

Personal Website:	<a href="https://www.andysayler.com">https://www.andysayler.com</a>
Github Projects:	<a href="https://github.com/asayler">https://github.com/asayler</a>
LinkedIn Profile:	<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pub/andrew-sayler/20/8/79a">https://www.linkedin.com/pub/andrew-sayler/20/8/79a</a>
Google Scholar:	<a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=n7fSFlIAAAAJ&amp;hl">https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=n7fSFlIAAAAJ&amp;hl</a>